










































What has science got to do with it?
Citation for published version:
Coyne, R 2011, 'What has science got to do with it?: Comment on ARQ article “Mind the evaluation gap:
reviewing the assessment of architectural research in the Netherlands” by Frank van der Hoeven' ARQ, vol
15, no. 3, pp. 205-206., 10.1017/S135913551100073X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S135913551100073X
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




© Coyne, R. (2011). What’s science got to do with it?. Architecture Research Quarterly, 11(3), 205-206. doi:
10.1017/S135913551100073X.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
	   1 
Comment on ARQ article “Mind the evaluation gap: reviewing the assessment of 
architectural research in the Netherlands” by Frank van der Hoeven 
 
Letter to the Editor 
 
What has science got to do with it? 
 
Frank van der Hoeven’s explanation of the system for assessing research in The 
Netherlands (reference) invites comparison with UK research cultures and the UK REF 
(Research Excellence Framework). 
 
The article notes that architecture as a design discipline doesn’t fit easily into research 
assessment regimes, especially in so far as research quality is judged through the ranking 
of journals. 
 
It seems that research assessment in The Netherlands also involves visits to research 
centres, suggesting that the assessment process is geared towards resource intensive 
large-scale organisations, facilities and laboratories.  
 
Van der Hoeven is at the Architecture Faculty at TU Delft, which is such a large 
organisation. Comparing the population size of the two countries, and the numbers of 
architecture schools in each, it’s a fair guess that architectural education and research in 
the Netherlands is concentrated in a few institutions. Contrast this with the dispersal 
evident in the UK. I suspect the same applies to other disciplines. This is bound to account 
for some of the differences in approach to research assessment between the two 
countries. 
 
The quote from the 1997 assessment of Architecture at TU Delft is sobering: that 
architecture is neither science nor technology, and not as empirical as social science, is 
centred on the impact of distinctive individuals, and architecture depends on intuition, 
ideas and sometimes on ideology. Van der Hoeven indicates that this summary is not so 
much an indictment of architecture as an admission of the inadequacies of The Netherland 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) who conduct the institutional research 
assessment. They seem unable to cope with the diversity of research within universities. 
 
One conclusion from the article is that architecture at TU Delft suffers from being in a 
technical university, and might fare better in a university that specialises in the 
humanities. 
 
The recommendations in the concluding section of van de Hoeven’s article seem sound to 
me given the research climate in The Netherlands as described.  
 
However, I do have difficulty with the article’s concluding remark that architecture must 
get “the basics of its own scientific foundations right,” an assumption that pervades the 
rest of the article, and, more significantly, the Dutch research assessment process. 
 
I generally have taken references to “science” in Continental research projects, 
conferences and publications with a pinch of salt, and happily substituted the word 
“research” where I see a peer review panel designated as a “scientific committee” or sound 
scholarship in various ways equated to science.  
 
This article however highlights problems of deploying a particular conception of science as 
the benchmark for what constitutes quality research. 
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The UK REF makes no such assumptions about research. In any REF criteria documents 
the idea of “scientific underpinnings” appears only in reference to the natural sciences, and 
not at all in reference to the technology disciplines, social sciences, arts and humanities. 
 
The Netherlands’ model is suggestive less of science than scientism, about which much has 
been written in the academic literature as well as the popular press in the UK. 
 
The critique of scientism and its variants is standard fare in textbooks on the philosophy of 
science. Consider this account from A.F Chalmers’ What is This Thing Called Science?, (still 
in print since 1976) of what he terms naïve inductivism. There’s a popular view that: 
“Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge. Scientific theories are derived in some rigorous 
way from the facts of experience acquired by observation and experiment … Personal 
opinion or preferences and speculative imaginings have no place in science.” (p.1) He then 
marshals the full weight of 20th century philosophy to refute this naïve conception of 
science. The criticism from philosophy of science is not just against those who seek to 
apply scientific principles and processes to areas outside its legitimate domain, but that 
this popular view of what is science misrepresents science. 
 
The beacons of the philosophy of science include Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul 
Feyerabend, and Bruno Latour who refute scientism from various angles: arguing that 
scientific observations are theory and value laden, science takes place within communities, 
science can be anarchic, etc, all suggesting that science is as dependent on processes of 
interpretation, community, and tradition as any aspect of the humanities. The field of 
research known as STS (science and technology studies) adds talk of socio-technical 
systems, the co-dependence of science, technologies, instruments and social relations. 
 
Count the encyclopaedist, systematizer and educational reformer Peter Ramus (1515-
1572), the Dutch rationalist philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment amongst the champions of the view that science provides an 
overarching measure of rationality and understanding. 
 
But scientism had its heyday with the movement known as logical positivism that 
developed with the Vienna Circle in the 1920s. Under similar influences Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy was promoting his General Systems Theory (GST) that sought to codify the 
processes underpinning nature, all the sciences, engineering, human organisation, 
economics, and even design.  
 
Because of their promise of providing instruments for making decisions and controlling 
organisations, such encyclopaedism, logical positivism, systems theory and the attendant 
optimistic scientism have been major influences in management, public administration and 
education. Scientism instils amongst many a sense of a plan and promises resolution in 
the event of a social crisis. With its pretence at rationality and externality, and rendering 
decision-making processes explicit that are otherwise hidden, it suggests public 
accountability. 
 
The management scientist, Herbert Simon was such an optimistic systematiser. He said in 
The Sciences of the Artificial in 1969 
 
“The professional schools will reassume their professional responsibilities just to the 
degree that they can discover a science of design, a body of intellectually tough, analytic, 
partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process.” (p.58) 
 
Early systems theory suggests that by logical rules, tables and charts, and that by laying 
complex issues out on a table or graph one achieves a satisfactory overview. Everything is 
in its right box. There’s also a bureaucratic strand to this latter day Ramism: the 
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bureaucratisation of knowledge, concepts illustrated in the checklists and self-evaluation 
tables that pervade research assessment in some quarters, and as illustrated well in van 
de Hoeven’s article.  
 
This rationalist tendency is evident in the UK, as is the idea of assigning numbers and 
“quality profiles” to performance in the REF. 
 
But this positivist inclination is moderated in UK education and research fields by a 
pragmatic liberalism. The liberal influence of the American philosopher John Dewey is well-
represented in the writings of theorists of education, organisation, urban studies and 
design Chris Argyris and Donald Schön who offer polite riposte to Simon’s systematisation, 
highlighting the complex interplay of problem setting, reflection, action, interpretation and 
metaphor within professional life and human rationality. 
 
Research in the UK seems to be characterised by a pluralism so informed. In some 
quarters there’s a recognition that there are many research paradigms, models, and views 
in play that are often critical of one another. The differences are for peer review groups to 
resolve or accommodate. Public accountability is important, and even social, cultural and 
economic impact, but these do not require putative scientific methods for their 
assessment, or the requirement that all researchers see their work as science. 
 
In the United Kingdom there are eight major government-sponsored research funding 
councils, supporting science, medicine, engineering and the social sciences. The most 
recently formed funding body is the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) that 
explicitly encourages, and funds, art and design practice as modes of research, and 
creative works, exhibitions, designs, buildings, compositions and performances as research 
output. 
 
In its documentation and practice, this research council seems genuinely led by a desire to 
assert subject matter, approaches and methods that come from within the arts and 
humanities, without needing to draw on the authority and techniques of science. This 
liberal approach seems currently to be mirrored in the REF. 
 
There are threats to the arts and humanities. The UK government intends to drop central 
funding for non-STEM subjects in Universities (ie subjects outside of science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics), with the shortfall to be met by student fees. But whatever 
this means for the arts and humanities it does not suggest, or require, the re-introduction 
of a new bureaucratic scientism to research policy in the country. 
 
Architectural practice has long decided that there was no need to appeal to science to 
legitimate its activities, and the studio teaching method, with its open-ended, dialogical 
and materially-based practices has re-asserted itself as a highly respected model of 
education, and of research. 
 





Richard Coyne is Professor of Architectural Computing at the University of Edinburgh and 
was formerly Head of the School of Arts, Culture and Environment. He authored Derrida 
for Architects (Routledge, 2011) and co-authored Interpretation in Architecture: Design as 
a Way of Thinking with Adrian Snodgrass (Routledge, 2006). 
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